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Abstract
A key phenomenon in inductive reasoning is the diversity effect, whereby a novel property is more likely to be generalized when
it is shared by an evidence sample composed of diverse instances than a sample composed of similar instances. We outline a
Bayesian model and an experimental study that show that the diversity effect depends on the assumption that samples of evidence
were selected by a helpful agent (strong sampling). Inductive arguments with premises containing either diverse or nondiverse
evidence samples were presented under different sampling conditions, where instructions and filler items indicated that the
samples were selected intentionally (strong sampling) or randomly (weak sampling). A robust diversity effect was found under
strong sampling, but was attenuated under weak sampling. As predicted by our Bayesian model, the largest effect of sampling
was on arguments with nondiverse evidence, where strong sampling led to more restricted generalization than weak sampling.
These results show that the characteristics of evidence that are deemed relevant to an inductive reasoning problem depend on
beliefs about how the evidence was generated.
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Philosophers of science have suggested that diverse evidence
leads to more robust generalization (e.g., Hempel, 1966). The
Bdiversity effect^ in category-based induction suggests that
most adults share this intuition: people are more likely to
generalize a novel property to other category members when
that property is shared by a diverse set of categories rather than
a nondiverse set. For example, knowing that lions and cows
have some property p is generally seen as a stronger basis for
generalizing that property to other mammals than knowing
that lions and tigers have property p (Osherson, Smith,
Wilkie, Lopez, & Shafir, 1990). This diversity effect is robust,
having been replicated across a range of reasoning tasks and
category stimuli (e.g., Feeney&Heit, 2011; Liew, Grisham, &
Hayes, 2018; Osherson et al., 1990). Moreover, diverse sam-
ples of evidence have been shown to facilitate hypothesis
testing (e.g., López, 1995) and promote conceptual change
(Hayes, Goodhew, Heit, & Gillan, 2003). Early accounts of
the diversity effect in category-based induction emphasized
the crucial role of similarity between those categories known
to have a property (premise categories) and the categories to
which the property could be generalized (conclusion catego-
ries). Osherson et al.’s (1990) influential similarity-coverage
model, for example, attributes the diversity effect to the fact
that diverse premise categories (e.g., lions and cows) have
greater Bcoverage^ of broader conclusion categories such as
mammals (i.e., diverse premise categories are similar to more
members of a superordinate like mammals than are
nondiverse categories).
There is a growing consensus in the field, however, that
similarity alone is insufficient to explain property induction
(e.g., Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2009; Medin, Coley, Storms, &
Hayes, 2003). Inductive arguments involving premise and
conclusion categories (e.g., lions and cows have p, therefore
mammals have p) are often communicative acts, designed to
influence the beliefs of the reasoner, and as such, pragmatic
inferences can shape the perceived strength of the inductive
argument (Goodman & Frank, 2016; Grice, 1975).
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Experimental manipulations of the communicative context
influence how people interpret an inductive argument
(Ransom, Perfors, & Navarro, 2016; Voorspoels, Navarro,
Perfors, Ransom, & Storms, 2015), in a manner consistent
with Bayesian theories of inductive reasoning (Navarro, Dry,
& Lee, 2012; Sanjana & Tenenbaum, 2003; Tenenbaum &
Griffiths, 2001).Within the Bayesian framework, these effects
are seen as reflecting changes in sampling assumptions—
assumptions that a reasoner makes about how an inductive
argument was constructed.
Much of the literature on sampling assumptions has fo-
cused on the effect of adding new evidence (e.g., additional
premise categories) to an inductive argument (e.g., Fernbach,
2006; Ransom et al., 2016). However, to the extent that these
findings reflect the operation of more general principles of
Bayesian reasoning (Sanjana & Tenenbaum, 2003;
Tenenbaum& Griffiths, 2001), one might wonder if sampling
assumptions also shape the value people assign to the diversity
of evidence in inductive arguments. Our goal in this article is
to address this question. Is the diversity effect in inductive
reasoning purely a similarity-driven effect, or does it depend
on how the reasoner believes the inductive argument was
constructed?
Reasoning as Bayesian inference
The Bayesian perspective on inductive reasoning asserts that
human reasoning can be viewed as a form of probabilistic
inference (Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2009; Sanjana &
Tenenbaum, 2003). Consider an inductive argument whose
premises assert that the categories x = (x1, . . . , xn) possess
property p. When asked to assess the evidence for some hy-
pothesis h about which categories share the property in light of
the evidence x presented in an argument, the learner reasons as
follows. Based on their preexisting knowledge of the world,
the reasoner initially assigns some prior degree of plausibility
P(h) to the claim. This prior belief P(h) is updated via Bayes
rule to a posterior belief P(h|x) that takes account of the evi-
dence, as follows:





The central characteristic of this belief revision is that it is
driven by the likelihood P(x|h) that the reasoner would have
encountered the evidence x if the hypothesis h correctly de-
scribed the true extension of the property p. Importantly, this
likelihood is subjective: It is based on the reasoner’s personal
theory about how the inductive argument was constructed,
referred to as the sampling assumption (e.g., Fernbach,
2006; Navarro et al., 2012; Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001).
To illustrate the workings of the Bayesian model, consider
a simple reasoning problem. Suppose a reasoner is told about
a novel biological property p (e.g., leptine) and asked to infer
which species of animals possess the property. Plausible hy-
potheses hmight correspond to categories at varying levels in
a taxonomic hierarchy. For simplicity, we suppose that the
learner considers the six mammal categories listed in Fig. 1,
and that all six are deemed equally plausible a priori (hence,
P(h) = 1/6). We further assume that combinations of catego-
ries (e.g., canines and ursines) are not entertained.
A key implication of our approach is that sampling assump-
tions matter more for inferences based on nondiverse evidence.
To illustrate, suppose that the learner is now told that dogs and
wolves both produce leptine. How should a Bayesian reasoner
behave? The answer depends on what the reasoner believes
about why they were informed about dogs and wolves, specifi-
cally. One possibility—known as weak sampling—is that these
two animals were chosen at random, and by chance it happened
to be two canines, and (also by chance) the two canines do
produce leptine. Because the items are chosen at random, irre-
spective of whether or not they have the property in question, the
likelihood takes on a constant value P(x|h) ∝ 1 for every hypoth-
esis that is consistent with the evidence (i.e., canines, placentals,
mammals), andP(x|h) = 0 for all hypotheses that are not (ursines,
macropods, marsupials). The posterior distribution is therefore
evenly spread across the three still-plausible hypotheses—that
is, P(h|x) = 1/3 (see Fig. 1a).
Another alternative in the literature is known as strong sam-
pling, and describes situations where the premise categories x are
selected precisely because they possess the property p. Perhaps a
helpful teacher looked up a list of leptine-producing animals and
then randomly chose two illustrative animal items from this list
(e.g., dog and wolf). This produces a model in which the prob-
ability of sampling item x is given by P(x|h) = 1/|h|, where |h|
denotes the size of the hypothesis. Importantly, this leads to a
change in the reasoning process. If the learner believes there are
36 species of canine in the list, then for h = canines, the proba-
bility of choosing a wolf is 1/36, and the probability of choosing
a wolf and a dog (without replacement) is 1/36 × 1/35 ≈ 7.9 ×
10−4. In contrast, if the true extension of the category is all mam-
mals (h = mammals), the chance of selecting a wolf and a dog is
extremely small, say 1/5,000 × 1/4,999 ≈ 4.0 − 10−8. Taking the
ratio of these two probabilities, P(wolf, dog | canines) : P(wolf,
dog | mammals) = 7.9 × 10−4 : 4.0 × 10−8 ≈ 19,837:1, we see that
the evidence is muchmore likely under the smaller hypothesis (h
= canines). Repeating the exercise for the case of canines versus
placentals, we find a similarly large ratio. That is, P(wolf, dog |
canines) : P(wolf, dog | placentals) = 7.9 − 10-4 : 6.3 × 10-8 ≈
12,692:1 Thus, after eliminating those hypotheses that are incon-
sistent with the evidence (ursines, macropods, and marsupials),
the posterior distribution overwhelmingly favors the canine hy-
pothesis over the placental or mammal hypothesis (see Fig. 1b).
Specifically, P(canines | wolf, dog) = (0.16 × 7.9 * 10−4) / ((0.16
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× 7.9 × 10−4) + (0.16 × 4.0 × 10−8) + (0.16 × 6.3 × 10−8)) ≈ 0.99.
By comparison, P(mammals | wolf, dog) ≈ 5.0 ×10−5, and
P(placentals | wolf, dog)≈ 7.9 ×10−5. The strong samplingmodel
therefore embodies a size principle in which the reasoner comes
to prefer the smallest ormost specific hypothesis that is consistent
with the evidence.
To illustrate the implications for the diversity effect, con-
sider how the previous example plays out if the reasoner is
given diverse evidence, say, that dogs and koalas produce
leptine. In this situation, the sampling model is largely irrele-
vant: The evidence is only consistent with a single hypothesis
(mammals), so the reasoner will strongly endorse an argument
generalizing from dogs and koalas to all mammals, regardless
of the sampling assumption (see Fig. 1c–d). This leads to our
key prediction about the impact of sampling assumptions on
the diversity effect—the effect will be far larger under strong
sampling assumptions (compare Fig. 1b and d) than under
weak sampling assumptions (compare Fig. 1a and c).
Moreover, a simulation of diversity effects under strong or
weak sampling over a larger and more general hypothesis
space showed that this is a generic prediction of the
Bayesian framework (see Supplementary Materials for simu-
lation details and https://osf.io/fpx9k/ for the simulation code).
The simulation results shown in Fig. 2a show that both weak
and strong sampling models predict a diversity effect (i.e.,
higher evidence for property generalizat ion to a
superordinate conclusion category with more diverse as
compared with less diverse premises), but the effect is more
pronounced under strong sampling, as indicated by the steeper
curve. A notable but perhaps less obvious prediction from this
model is that, overall, we should see stronger generalization to
a superordinate under weak sampling than under strong
sampling.
Experiment
We carried out an experimental test of these predictions in a
property-induction experiment in which target arguments con-
taining diverse or nondiverse premises were presented to
a) Non−diverse evidence                     b) Non−diverse evidence
             Strong sampling
c) Diverse evidence                     d) Diverse evidence
     Weak sampling
    Weak sampling                        Strong sampling
Fig. 1 Bayesian reasoning on the example problem. We assume a
uniform prior over six hypotheses (dashed line) about which mammal
categories have a property p (P(h) = 1/6), and approximately accurate
knowledge of the real-world size of each category: canines (|h| = 36),
ursines (|h| = 8), all placentals (|h| = 4,000), macropods (|h| = 59), all
marsupials (|h| = 334) and all mammals (|h| = 5,000). This toy model
highlights the key qualitative constraint: When the evidence is
nondiverse, the willingness to generalize to a superordinate depends on
sampling assumptions. Under strong sampling, nondiverse evidence will
lead to a marked reduction in generalization to the superordinate (panel
b). Under weak sampling, this reduction will be smaller (panel a).
However, when evidence is diverse (panels c and d), the willingness to
endorse a superordinate category (mammals) should be high regardless of
how the evidence was selected (strong or weak sampling)
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groups under conditions that promoted an assumption of ei-
ther strong or weak sampling. Each group received instruc-
tions that described the process by which premises were se-
lected (selected by a helpful agent vs. selected randomly),
together with a set of filler arguments, designed to reinforce
this description. In the strong sampling group, fillers resem-
bled target items and contained diverse and nondiverse argu-
ments with the same conclusion category. In the weak sam-
pling group, the fillers conveyed the impression that the pre-
mises had been generated randomly. This combination of in-
structional and item manipulation has been successful in pre-
vious work in shifting people toward a belief in strong or weak
sampling (Ransom et al., 2016; Voorspoels et al., 2015), and
has been more effective than cover-story manipulations alone
(see Navarro et al., 2012).
Participants
One hundred and eighty-seven participants from the United
States were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk
(AMT) and paid US$1.00. All had high approval status
(≥95% approval for previous tasks). Three were excluded be-
cause they failed the attention check administered at the end of
the procedures (see below for details). The final sample total
was 184 (81 female, 103 male; age: M = 35.97 years, SD =
10.92), with equal numbers randomly assigned to strong or
weak sampling groups.
Materials
In each sampling condition, 12 arguments were constructed as
shown in Table 1. Each argument contained three premise
categories and a more general conclusion category, all drawn
from the domain of living things. The same six target argu-
ments were presented to each sampling group, half with di-
verse premises and half with nondiverse premises (see
Table 1a–b). Diverse and nondiverse versions of each argu-
ment had the same conclusion.
Because property induction is affected by the typicality of
premises (i.e., the extent to which each premise category is
seen as representative of the broader conclusion category;
Osherson et al., 1990), it was important that this was con-
trolled. Premises for target arguments were chosen in order
to match the mean premise typicality across diverse and
nondiverse versions, as rated by 162 participants recruited
through AMTwho were paid US$0.50 but did not participate
in the main study.
The two sampling groups received six different filler items.
In strong sampling, the fillers were three arguments with di-
verse premises and three with nondiverse premises (see
Table 1c for examples). In weak sampling, each filler
contained three premises, drawn from two or three different
superordinate categories of living things (see Table 1d for
examples). To further reinforce the impression of randomness,
four of the six fillers in this condition contained at least one
premise which was said to BNOT have^ the property (see
https://osf.io/fpx9k/ for all experimental materials and data,
including premise typicality ratings).
Procedure
Participants received instructions indicating that argument
premises had been selected to be helpful for determining
Fig. 2 Predicted interaction between premise diversity and sampling type
based on our simulation (panel a), qualitative predictions derived from the
simulation (panel b), and the empirical data (panel c). Panel c plots the
mean ratings, and error bars depict standard errors. To produce the model
prediction in Fig. 2b from the curves in Fig. 2a, we assumed that there was
some latent Bperceived^ diversity for the premises in the diverse
conditions (d) and the nondiverse conditions (n) in our experiment. We
estimated these parameters by minimizing sum squared error between
empirical means and model generalizations (see Supplementary
Materials for details)
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property extension (strong sampling) or generated randomly
(weak sampling). In the strong sampling condition the text
read:
On each trial you will see three instances of living things
that have a particular property. Note that the instances
were deliberately chosen to best illustrate the variety of
living things that have the property.
In contrast, the weak sampling text emphasized the arbi-
trariness of the sampling process:
On each trial you will see three instances of living things
that have a particular property. We asked a student to
open a book on plants and animals at random pages
and note the first three living things they came across
and whether or not those living things have the property
in question. This means the information you receive may
not be the most helpful for making your judgment—by
chance, the student will sometimes select very dissimilar
items, and sometimes very similar ones.
They then saw 12 test trials (three diverse targets, three
nondiverse targets, six fillers) in random order. On each trial,
three premises were listed as having a shared novel property
(or in fillers in the weak condition, some premises were shown
not to have the property). Participants then rated the likelihood
that all members of the conclusion category had the property
(1 = not very likely, 7 = very likely; hereafter Bargument
strength^). For each participant, the property attached to each
argument was drawn randomly from the 12 fictitious biolog-
ical properties shown in Table 1e, with a different property
used on each trial. After test, there was an attention check
where participants had to identify the largest integer in a ran-
dom sequence.
Results
Ratings of argument strength were first averaged across the
three diverse and three nondiverse targets for each participant
in the strong and weak sampling groups. Mean group argu-
ment strength ratings and within-group standard errors for
diverse and nondiverse arguments are plotted in Fig. 2c.
There is a clear diversity effect: Properties shared by diverse
premises were more likely to be generalized (M = 5.08, SE =
.09) than properties shared by less diverse premises (M = 4.48,
SE = .08, BF10 > 1,000, ηp
2 = 0.25).1 The sampling manipu-
lation also influenced ratings of argument strength in the ex-
pected fashion, with participants in the weak sampling condi-
tion giving higher ratings overall (M = 5.23, SE = .11) than
those in the strong condition (M = 4.33, SE = .11, BF10 >
1,000, ηp
2 = 0.15). Most importantly, there is strong evidence
for an interaction: As predicted by our theoretical analysis, the
diversity effect is attenuated under weak sampling relative to
strong sampling (BF10 = 36.0, ηp
2 = 0.07). To confirm that the
form of this interaction is indeed an attenuation of the diversity
effect in the weak sampling condition (as opposed to a disap-
pearance of the effect), we ran a Bayesian paired-samples t test
for this condition alone and found strong evidence that the
effect (BF10 = 136.0) still exists in this condition. Taken to-
gether, the higher overall level of generalization in the weak
sampling condition and the fact that there is still a modest
1 Bayes factors were calculated using a mixed-effects Bayesian ANOVA, con-
ducted using the BayesFactor package in R with default Cauchy priors.
Table 1 The inductive arguments used in the task
(a) Target arguments (diverse) (b) Target arguments (nondiverse)
dogs, rats, whales → all mammals rabbits, raccoons, squirrels → all mammals
octopi, eels, trout→ all sea creatures sardines, herring, anchovies → all sea creatures
flies, termites, millipedes → all insects bees, wasps, hornets→ all insects
(c) Filler arguments (strong sampling condition)
cows, mice, seals→ all mammals zebras, giraffes, camels → all mammals
pigeons, hens, ostriches → all birds ducks, swans, pelicans→ all birds
apples, peaches, papaya → all fruit strawberries, blueberries, raspberries → all fruit
(d) Filler arguments (weak sampling condition)
chickens, condors, coconuts → all mammals geese, skunks, ¬ carp → all mammals
elephants, moths, pineapples → all birds robins, salmon, ¬ cod → all sea creatures
spiders, finches, ¬ worms → all insects ¬ tigers, ¬ bananas, locusts → all fruit
(e) List of properties used
leptine biotin protein K12 pyroxene
sarca the chemical didymium dihedron enzyme J6
traces of magnesium actone bynein lutein
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diversity effect in this condition suggest that people in this
condition are not simply ignoring similarity among categories
as a source of evidence, rather, they appear to assign different
evidentiary value to this similarity.
Exploratory analysis suggested that the attenuation effect
was consistent across the target arguments listed in Table 1,
but heterogeneous across the 187 participants. Highlighting
the homogeneity across arguments, Fig. 3 depicts the cumu-
lative distribution functions over mean rated argument
strength across participants in each sampling condition, plot-
ted separately for each target argument. Where one argument
received higher average ratings than another, its correspond-
ing line appears to the right of the other. The fact that all of the
grey lines (diverse arguments) appear to the right of all of the
black lines (nondiverse arguments) illustrates the consistency
of the diversity effect across arguments and between condi-
tions (albeit attenuated under weak sampling). In contrast, Fig.
4 reveals individual differences across subjects in the strong
sampling condition: the majority show large diversity effects
(dots above the diagonal line) whereas a substantial minority
(around 30%) show little to no diversity effect at all (dots near
or below the diagonal line).
Discussion
The effect of evidential diversity on property induction is one
of the most widely replicated findings in the field of inductive
reasoning. When introducing their Bayesian generalization
model, Tenenbaum and Griffiths (2001) argued that it natural-
ly accommodates the effect of diversity on inductive argument
strength. In this article, we extend their analysis. We have
shown empirically that the magnitude of the diversity effect
depends on participants’ assumptions about how the evidence
has been selected. As predicted by the Bayesian model, when
led to believe strong sampling applies, a robust diversity effect
appeared. However, when the context suggested that evidence
was generated randomly (weak sampling), the diversity effect
was attenuated.
Notably, this attenuation meant that overall ratings of prop-
erty generalization were higher under weak than under strong
sampling. As predicted, the largest effect of sampling was on
inferences from evidence with low diversity where strong
sampling prompted more restricted property generalization
than weak sampling. In all crucial respects, the group empir-
ical results were consistent with the ordinal predictions of the
Bayesian model.
In regard to the generality of these effects, the predicted
difference in the magnitude of the diversity effect under weak
and strong sampling assumptions was obtained consistently
across a variety of inductive arguments (see Fig. 3). Although
our experiment only examined the results of a single
operationalization of diversity (diverse vs. nondiverse pre-
mises), our simulation results (see Fig. 2a) shows that the
same qualitative prediction about the effects of sampling as-
sumptions holds across a range of possible levels of evidence
diversity. The relationship between diversity effects and sam-
pling assumptions should therefore be seen as a generic pre-
diction of Bayesian inductive reasoning models. There was,
however, suggestive evidence (see Fig. 4) for some heteroge-
neity in the effects of sampling assumptions across subjects.
Although a majority in the strong sampling condition showed
a robust diversity effect, some showed little effect of evidence
diversity. This could reflect individual differences in belief in
Argument Strength Argument Strength
Fig. 3 Cumulative distribution functions for argument strength ratings for
all three diverse targets (black) and all three nondiverse targets (grey),
plotted separately by condition. The y-axis plots the probability that the
participant rated the argument as strong or less strongly than the value on
the x-axis. In all cases, the grey lines are shifted to the right of the black
lines, indicating that the diverse argument was rated as stronger. The tight
clustering of all curves in the weak sampling condition (left) compared
with the strong sampling condition (right) illustrates that the attenuated
diversity effect is observed for all target arguments
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the cover story used to manipulate sampling assumptions, in
knowledge of biological categories, or a more fundamental
difference in the way that different individuals generate induc-
tive hypotheses from diverse or nondiverse evidence (cf.
Navarro et al., 2012; Ransom, Hendrickson, Perfors, &
Navarro, 2018).
Our theoretical analysis and results make an important con-
tribution by highlighting the central role played by sampling
assumptions in important inductive phenomena like the diver-
sity effect. Previous theoretical explanations of this effect
(e.g., Heit, Hahn, & Feeney, 2005; Osherson et al., 1990) have
focused on how diverse sample content promotes property
generalization. The Osherson et al. (1990) model, for exam-
ple, assumes that more diverse samples support broader gen-
eralization because they provide more coverage of the catego-
ry of interest. In contrast, our approach suggests that the
strength of the diversity effect depends on one’s assumptions
about how premise information is selected—especially for the
nondiverse samples. The fact that many previous studies
(Feeney & Heit, 2011; Liew et al., 2018; Osherson et al.,
1990) have demonstrated robust diversity effects in property
induction without explicit manipulation of sampling assump-
tions suggests that strong sampling of the presented evidence
may be the default for a majority of subjects. Notably, the
assumption of strong sampling may be more widespread
amongst adults than children. Rhodes, Gelman, and
Brickman (2010) found that diverse evidence affected 5-
year-olds’ inferences when it was presented by a knowledge-
able domain Bexpert,^ but not when it was presented by a
domain Bnovice.^ In contrast diverse evidence affected adults’
inferences in both conditions.
Our results add to a growing body of evidence highlighting
the central role of sampling assumptions in determining what
characteristics of an argument are deemed relevant to an in-
ductive reasoning problem. For instance, when introducing
the relevance theory perspective on inductive reasoning,
Medin et al. (2003) demonstrated a premise nonmonotonicity
effect, in which adding premises that share a distinctive rela-
tion (e.g., adding the premise black bears to grizzly bears)
weakened belief that the premise properties generalized to a
conclusion category (mammals). By casting this in an explic-
itly Bayesian framework, Ransom et al. (2016) showed that
this effect arises naturally from a strong sampling assumption,
and can be reversed when learners are encouraged to adopt a
weak sampling perspective. A similar effect of sampling as-
sumptions was found when learners were presented with com-
binations of positive and negative evidence (Voorspoels et al.,
2015).Whether considering the quantity of evidence (Ransom
et al., 2016), the kind of evidence (Voorspoels et al., 2015), or,
as we show here, the diversity of evidence, the inferences
people make are highly dependent on their beliefs about the
sampling mechanisms involved.
This study highlights that category-based induction, like
other tasks that involve drawing conclusions from data
(Gweon, Tenenbaum, & Schulz, 2010; Shafto, Goodman, &
Griffiths, 2014), is highly sensitive to sampling assumptions.
It also raises questions about the precise sampling assump-
tions involved. Consistent with many previous studies (e.g.,
Gweon et al., 2010; Navarro et al., 2012; Ransom et al., 2016),
we framed the question as one of Bstrong^ and Bweak^ sam-
pling. In many other studies, however, the key difference is
characterized as a contrast between Bhelpful^ (or pedagogical)
and Brandom^ sampling (e.g., Shafto et al., 2014; Voorspoels
et al., 2015), suggesting that the social context is critical to
these effects. Although there are some contexts where the
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Fig. 4 Scatterplots showing individual subject ratings. Each dot depicts a
single participant, plotting the average rating they provided to the three
nondiverse arguments (x-axis) against their average response to the three
diverse targets (y-axis). Under weak sampling (left panel), the diversity
effect is reflected by the fact that the distribution (contours) is shifted very
slightly upwards from the diagonal line. Under strong sampling (right
panel), a different pattern is seen: A majority of participants show a
large diversity effect (points above the diagonal) whereas a minority
show no diversity effect at all (dots lying on the diagonal)
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different kinds of inferences (e.g., Navarro et al. 2012), the
distinction is not crucial for understanding the diversity effect.
More generally, the current work highlights a need to investi-
gate how learners’ beliefs about evidence generation and
transmission affect the range of other inductive phenomena
(see Hayes & Heit, 2018, for a review) that have been central
to building theories of category-based inference.
Constraints on generality
Our work shows that the diversity effect in property induction
depends, in part, on an assumption that the evidence presented
in the experiment (i.e., the argument premises) was not select-
ed randomly. Our target population for this work was adult
reasoners. Because the diversity effect has been replicated in
adult samples from a range of cultural backgrounds (e.g.,
United States, Belgium, Australia, China, Korea; see Choi,
Nisbett, & Smith 1997; Medin et al., 2003), we expect that
our results will have considerable cross-cultural generality. A
constraint on generality is that we only examined diversity
using categories and properties drawn from the domain of
biology. It remains to be shown whether our results extend
to reasoning about other domains (e.g., artifacts, social cate-
gories). Within the biological domain, we assume that our
results apply to people with a modest amount of knowledge
about biological kinds. However, they most likely do not ap-
ply to those with expert domain knowledge—who often do
not show diversity effects when reasoning about objects with-
in their area of expertise (e.g., Shafto & Coley, 2003).
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